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We need a better understanding of what drives right-wing
extremist violence
Rachel Briggs and Matthew Goodwin explore some of the factors that drive individuals to
adopt a right-wing extremist identity and maintain that more research needs to be
conducted into why some engage in violent activities. 
The trial of  Anders Breivik – and its f orthcoming conclusion – has sparked a resurgence
of  interest in one area of  research that is of ten ignored by social scientists: right-wing
extremist violence. In contrast to a vast body of  research on al-Qaeda or ‘AQ’- inspired
religious-based f orms of  extremism that has set out to identif y the social, psychological,
physical and contextual f actors that render some cit izens susceptible radicalization, there
is a distinct lack of  attention to the drivers and perpetrators of  violence and/or terrorism
motivated by right-wing extremist narratives and ideologies. Furthermore, this ‘gap’ in the
existing evidence base has arisen despite recent warnings f rom London Metropolitan
Police, the Department f or Homeland Security in the United States and security services in
Germany about the potential f or violence f rom an evolving extreme right scene.
It is f or this reason that we set out to explore the state of  existing research in Europe on right-wing
extremist violence, and make this material accessible to a wide audience of  policy makers, security
of f icials and researchers through a brief ing paper, published by the Institute f or Strategic Dialogue (ISD).
Although caref ul not to overstate the scale of  the problem (large-scale events like the Norway attacks
are rare), evidence shows that there is a pernicious core of  extremists seeking to perpetrate sizeable
attacks. The discovery of  the National Socialist Underground (NSU) or the ‘Zwickau’ cell in Germany is a
timely reminder of  this; the clandestine group was responsible f or the murder of  nine immigrants, a
policewoman and bombing in Cologne.
There are numerous other examples of  the potential f or violence f rom within the extreme right: in 2010,
the conf iscation of  improvised explosive and incendiary devices f rom activists in the neo-Nazi
Kameradschaf t Aachener Land (KAL) in Germany; in 2007, the conviction of  a Brit ish National Party (BNP)
candidate who had stockpiled chemical explosives due to his f ears over ‘uncontrolled immigration’; and,
in the same year in Russia, the execution of  two members of  a minority group under a Swastika f lag (one
of  whom was beheaded) and, more generally, approximately 600 racially-motivated attacks and 80
murders linked to neo-Nazi and racist movements.
It is also worth stressing that right-wing extremists are engaged in high-f requency lower level acts of
violence, which cumulatively are having a serious impact on communities across Europe but are less likely
to make the national headlines. Neither do these kinds of  incidents f igure in tradit ional national security
threat assessments, which means that those attempting to counter right-wing extremists of ten struggle
to attract the f unding, resources and polit ical attention they need. These crimes are also hidden within
complex and dif f ering national crime reporting systems, which means it is dif f icult to track trends over
time or across borders. Due to a lack of  reliable and comparable data, it is virtually impossible to
ascertain whether levels of  right-wing extremism are increasing over t ime, or are more prevalent in
particular European states (or even, f or that matter, individual regions).
While we are beginning to understand the motivations behind AQ-inspired extremists, the relative dearth
of  social science research on right-wing extremist violence means we know a lot less about individual
perpetrators and what drives them. But researchers, particularly in Germany and Scandinavia, are
beginning to build up a picture. On the whole, perpetrators tend to be young men with average or low
levels of  education, f ew qualif ications and are pessimistic about their economic prospects. However,
rather than motivated by a comprehensive ideology there is evidence to suggest individuals are driven
more by a combination of  ‘thrill-seeking’, opportunism, and of ten arrive at right-wing extremist violence
f ollowing a long history of  criminality and/or alcohol and drug abuse problems.
They are involved in a range of  groupings and activit ies. First there are polit ical parties that contest
elections and who work within the law, but may have members who are involved in violence outside the
conf ines of  the party. Second, there are grassroots social movements that seek to recruit activists to
their cause. While many such groups do not of f icially condone violence, again many have members that
incite violence and some demonstrations lead to serious incidents of  civil unrest and violence. Third,
there are smaller groups and networks without f ormal membership or rigid structures, which tend to
adopt more extreme ideological posit ions. And f inally, there are so-called ‘lone actors’ that do not have
f ormal links to established groups and tend to act in isolation.
Clearly, lots of  research questions remain. One of  the key knowledge gaps relates to the link – or not –
between violent and non-violent f orms of  right-wing extremism. Is there a slippery slope f rom one to the
other? Do violent movements necessarily need their non-violent equivalents to provide polit ical cover
and justif ication f or their actions? What are the practical and logistical connections between the two?
And could the presence of  a strong f ar-right party within the polit ical sphere actually divert support away
f rom violent street movements? Another gap concerns the link – or not – between dif f erent f orms of
violent extremism, or what is described as cumulative extremism. In a similar f ashion to earlier trends in
cases such as Northern Ireland, are we beginning to see the emergence of  a spiral of  violence and
intergroup conf lict between more radical f ringes of  right-wing extremist groups, and radical Islamists?
Lastly, and at the individual level, what f actors ‘trip’ some supporters of  the electoral radical right into
violence, or what some within the movement ref er to as ‘direct action’? One recent and large scale survey
of  the attitudes of  extreme and radical right supporters in Britain reveals that the belief  in a f orthcoming
‘clash of  civilisations’ and the need f or violence to protect a wider group f rom perceived threats is
relatively widespread among rank-and-f ile members. Yet at present the social science literature speaks
only quietly to the question of  what f actors might ‘push and pull’ individuals toward more violent
outcomes.
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